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COMPETITION POLICY RETROSPECTIVE: THE FORMATION OF
THE UNITED LAUNCH ALLIANCE AND THE ASCENT OF SPACEX
William E. Kovacic1
ABSTRACT
Current Revision: August 11, 2020
In May 2005, Boeing and Lockheed Martin announced plans to form the
United Launch Alliance, a joint venture which combined the only two
suppliers of medium-to-heavy national security related launch services to the
U.S. government. The Federal Trade Commission reviewed the transaction’s
antitrust implications and, in consultation with the Department of Defense,
approved the deal in October 2006 subject to restrictions governing ULA’s
relationship other satellite manufacturers and providers of launch services.
The DOD endorsed the transaction on the ground that the joint venture would
increase launch reliability by concentrating production and launch services
in a single team rather than subdividing a declining amount of launch vehicle
production and launch preparation activities between two firms. The FTC’s
approval rested on two assumptions: that the claimed efficiencies were
significant, and that the DOD and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration would use best efforts to facilitate entry into the launch
services sector. Since 2006, ULA has achieved the reliability goals that
motivated the transaction, and SpaceX has emerged as a principal supplier
of launch services for NASA and the national security agencies. This article
examines the decisions of the DOD and the FTC in 2006 and considers the
assumptions supporting the 2006 decision in light of subsequent experience.
The ULA transaction illuminates important issues concerning the analysis of
efficiencies, entry, and innovation in high tech sectors and highlights how
public procurement can stimulate competition in concentrated markets.
Keywords: Aerospace, antitrust, innovation, mergers, public procurement.
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1

Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy, George Washington University Law School;
Visiting Professor, King’s College London; Non-Executive Director, United Kingdom Competition &
Markets Authority. The author has benefitted greatly from comments from Ellen Pint, David McNicol,
Bruce Williamson, and participants in the defense economics sessions of the 2019 Annual Conference
of the Western Economics Association International. The author also is grateful to Richard Buenneke
for many informative conversations about the space industry and national space policy. The author also
owes an immense intellectual debt to William Burnett, Frederick Lees, Glenn Monroe, and Dennis
Smallwood who, during their lifetimes, provided numerous insightful tutorials about the aerospace and
defense industries. Michael Margolis contributed superb research assistance. The views expressed here
are the author’s alone. Contact: wkovacic@law.gwu.edu.

1

INTRODUCTION
In May 2005, The Boeing Company and Lockheed Martin Corporation
announced plans to form the United Launch Alliance (“ULA”), a joint
venture which combined the only two suppliers of medium-to-heavy
(“MTH”) national security related launch services to the United States
government.13 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) conducted a review
of the antitrust implications of the transaction and, in consultation with the
Department of Defense (“DOD”), approved the deal in October 2006 subject
to restrictions governing ULA’s relationship other satellite manufacturers
and providers of launch services.14
The transaction confronted DOD and the FTC with difficult questions
concerning the future of the U.S. national security industrial base and the
application of competition policy in the aerospace and defense (“A&D”)
sector. The DOD recommended that the FTC approve the transaction, 15
mainly on the ground that the joint venture would increase launch reliability
by concentrating production and launch services in a single team rather than
subdividing launch vehicle production and launch preparation activities
between two separate organizations. 16 In the FTC’s review, the DOD’s
recommendation was decisive. 17 By a vote of 5-0, the FTC cleared the
transaction,18 though it did so with evident reluctance. 19 The Commission
observed: “In the U.S. government MTH launch services market, Boeing and
Lockheed are the only competitors, and their consolidation will result in a
13

United Launch Alliance, Press Release, Boeing, Lockheed Martin to Form Launch Services Joint
Venture (May 2, 2005)(hereinafter ULA Formation Press Release), at
https://www.ulalauanch.com/all_news_items/2005/05/02/boeing-lockheed-martin-to-form-launchservices-joint-venture.
14
In the Matter of Lockheed Martin Corp., the Boeing Co. & United Launch Alliance, L.L.C., 51-0165,
2006 WL 2925257 (F.T.C. Oct. 3, 2006)
15
Federal Trade Commission, The Boeing Company, Lockheed Martin Corporation and United Launch
Alliance: Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid Public Comment, 71 Fed. Reg.
60148, 60150 (Oct. 12, 2006) (hereinafter FTC Analysis to Aid Public Comment).
16
Kenneth J. Krieg, Undersecretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Letter to Deborah Platt
Majoras, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission (Aug. 15, 2006) (hereinafter Krieg Letter to Majoras).
17
Statement of Commissioner William E. Kovacic, with whom Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras and
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch Join, In the Matter of Lockheed Martin Corp., The Boeing Co., and
United Launch Alliance, L.L.C,, FTC File No. 051 0165, Docket No. C-4188 (Oct. 11, 2006)
(hereinafter Kovacic Statement), at www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510165/0510165kovacicmajorasrosch.pdf.
18
Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, FTC Intervenes in Formation of ULA Joint Venture by
Boeing and Lockheed Martin (Oct 3, 2006) (reporting 5-0 vote to accept consent agreement), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/10/ula.htm.
19
See, e.g., Concurring Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour, The Boeing
Company/Lockheed Martin Corp., Commission File No. 051-0165 (Oct. 11, 2006) (hereinafter Harbour
Concurring Statement) (“I reluctantly agree that the Commission must give DOD the benefit of the
doubt. I therefore vote to accept the proposed consent agreement.”), reprinted in 71 FED. REG. 60151
(Oct. 12, 2006).
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monopoly.” 20 The agency concluded that “significant anticompetitive
effects, including the loss of non-price competition and the loss of future
price competition, are likely if the proposed transaction is consummated.”21
A key consideration in the FTC’s clearance decision was the prospect of
future entry in the market for MTH launch services for U.S. government
customers.22 In 2002, entrepreneur Elon Musk had created a new company,
Space Exploration Technologies (“SpaceX”), to build launch vehicles that
could deliver payloads into space at dramatically lower costs than Boeing or
Lockheed Martin.23 When the FTC reviewed the proposed ULA venture,
SpaceX had yet to carry out a successful launch of its rocket, the Falcon. The
Commission offered no view about the ultimate prospects of success for
SpaceX, but it recited the formidable barriers that the company would face
in gaining acceptance from, and contracts with, government purchasers.24
Emphasizing that “the U.S. government only procures MTH launch services
and space vehicles from firms with a well-established track record for
success,” the Commission concluded “new entry is unlikely to reverse the
anticompetitive effects of the Proposed Joint Venture.”25
Notwithstanding this gloomy forecast, the FTC attempted to elicit
commitments from the government buyers to take steps that would qualify
SpaceX as a one of their suppliers. Before approving the transaction, the FTC
received spoken assurances from the DOD and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) that these government customers would use
best efforts to facilitate new entry – most notably, by SpaceX – to compete
to supply the U.S. government with launch services. 26 These assurances
were not included in the terms of the consent agreement between the FTC
and ULA, nor did the correspondence between the FTC and the government
buyers set out specific commitments.27 The DOD’s written statements to the
20

FTC Analysis to Aid Public Comment, supra note 4, at 60149.
Id. at 60150.
22
Id. at 60150 (discussing possible entry into the MTH launch services market for U.S. government
customers).
23
In 1995 Musk founded Zip2, which Compact purchased for $307 million in 1999. Musk invested
most of the $22 million he made from the sale of Zip2 into a start-up that became PayPal, which Ebay
acquired in 2002 for $1.5 billion. Musk took $100 million of his share of the PayPal proceeds and used
it to begin SpaceX in 2002 and then spent $70 million to create Tesla in 2003. Musk’s business career
is examined extensively in Ashlee Vance, ELON MUSK – TESLA, SPACEX AND THE QUEST FOR A
FANTASTIC FUTURE (2015).
24
FTC Analysis to Aid Public Comment, supra note 4, at 60149-50.
25
Id. at 60150.
26
I base this observation on my own participation in discussions with the DOD and NASA officials who
participated in the review of the ULA transaction.
27
See infra Part III (describing spoken and written interactions between the FTC and the government
purchasing agencies about the possible future role of SpaceX as a supplier of MTH launch services to
the DOD and NASA).
21
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FTC contained only vague aspirations for new entry, 28 yet the
Commissioners perceived that these spoken assurances were not perfunctory.
We perceived that the DOD and NASA were aware of the difficulties they
would encounter if they became irretrievably beholden to a supplier with
unassailable monopoly power. The board’s collective intuition was that the
government purchasers would make good faith efforts to encourage entry by
other firms as a way to motivate ULA.
In a statement issued on the day the FTC approved the ULA joint venture, I
said “[t]he ex post evaluation of the ULA settlement and other decisions
involving competition policy in the defense industry will be a useful
ingredient of future discussions between the FTC and DOD.”29 This Article
is an effort, nearly fifteen years later, to begin the promised assessment. This
Article considers how well the assumptions that supported the approval of
the ULA transaction have played out in practice. In assessing the joint
venture’s impact to date, this Article focuses on the judgments that the FTC
made about (a) the parties’ efficiency argument concerning scale economies
and reliability and (b) the prospects for future entry by companies to compete
for launch services contracts with government purchasers.
The conclusions drawn here are necessarily tentative, as the transaction’s full
impact will not become evident for years to come. Nonetheless, two
developments to date stand out. First, ULA thus far has met the reliability
expectations that guided the analysis of the DOD and the FTC. From its first
days of operation through July 30, 2020, ULA has made 140 consecutive
launches without a failure.30 The venture has achieved, and surpassed, the
reliability goals that the companies advanced in 2005-2006 as the key
rationale for their collaboration. This is a striking achievement in a field of
endeavor in which aerospace firms can never take success for granted.
Building reliable launch vehicles and delivering payloads to their intended
destinations in space are exceedingly hard tasks. Even a small lapse in
design, assembly, or operation of the powerful, complex machines that send
satellites and humans into space can have calamitous consequences.
See Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5, at 4 (“While the Atlas V and Delta IV are currently the
only launch vehicles capable of meeting current requirements, the Department is open to new U.S.
competitors for the launch services. The EELV acquisition strategy provides an annual
opportunity for new competitors to qualify for launch services contracts by responding to the
annual Notification of Contracting Action, which sets forth the details of the qualification process
and is published prior to each year’s Request for Proposals.”).
29
Kovacic Statement, supra note 6, at 2.
30
United Launch Alliance, Press Release, United Launch Alliance Atlas V Successfully Launches Mars
2020 Mission for NASA (July 30, 2020), at https://www.ulalaunch.com/about/news/2020/07/30/unitedlaunch-alliance-atlas-v-successfully-launches-mars-2020-mission-for-nasa.
28
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Second, the new suppliers of launch services (SpaceX and others) have made
remarkable progress toward becoming credible alternatives for NASA, the
national security agencies, and for commercial buyers. Ashlee Vance, author
of the leading biography of Elon Musk, observes that “SpaceX has become
the free radical trying to upend everything about this industry.”31 Journalist
Christian Davenport adds, “SpaceX went from a rich man’s folly that no one
took seriously to a disrupter that transformed the aerospace industry.”32 It is
unlikely that anyone (perhaps even Elon Musk) imagined in 2006 that in
2020 a SpaceX rocket and spacecraft would carry two American astronauts
safely to and from the International Space Station and restore the ability of
the United States to launch humans from its own spaceports into earth orbit.33
The ULA case study serves several purposes. First, the review of the ULA
venture illuminates how the DOD and the FTC resolved difficult issues
involving competition, innovation, entry, and efficiency in a technologically
complex and dynamic sector whose performance is essential to national
security. Second, the ULA venture suggests broader lessons about how
competition authorities can account for innovation effects in high technology
markets. Third, the ULA experience underscores the importance of public
procurement policy in shaping the competitive environment. The ULA case
study suggests how government procurement agencies might account for
competition in ways that increase the number and quality of options available
to government buyers and to purchasers in commercial markets. Finally, the
discussion suggests how a detailed reconstruction of individual enforcement
decisions can inform assessments about the design and implementation of
competition policy.
Vance, supra note 12, at 217.
Christian Davenport, Ascendant SpaceX plants flag on field long owned by Boeing, WASH. POST, May
24, 2020, at G1. In another account, Davenport noted that SpaceX “has become one of the most
improbable stories in the history of American enterprise, a combination of disruption, failure and
triumph that has transformed it from a spunky start-up to an industry powerhouse with some 7,000
employees.” Christian Davenport, As it prepares to fly humans, SpaceX faces the biggest challenge in
its history, WASH. POST, May 17, 2020, at A1 (hereinafter Biggest Challenge).
33
On May 30, 2020, a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket launched NASA astronauts Bob Behnken and Doug
Hurley into earth orbit from Cape Canaveral. The astronauts rode in a SpaceX Crew Dragon capsule
and successfully docked with the International Space Station on May 31. Irene Klotz, NASA’s New Era,
AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 15-28, 2020, at 22 (hereinafter NASA’s New Era). After 62 days at the
ISS, Behnken and Hurley returned safely to Earth on August 2. Jacob Bogage & Christian Davenport,
NASA astronauts aboard SpaceX’s Crew Dragon capsule splash down in the Gulf of Mexico, WASH.
POST, Aug. 2, 2020, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/08/02/spacex-returnupdates/?hypid=hp_hp-more-top-stories_spacex-445pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory-ans. This was the first
time since the discontinuation of NASA’s space shuttle program in 2011, after the return of the Space
Shuttle Atlantis in July of that year, that Americans had ridden into space on a launch that originated
within the United States. Christian Davenport & Jacob Bogage, SpaceX takes historic flight headed for
space station, WASH. POST, May 31, 2020, at A1. After NASA ended the shuttle program, the United
States had to purchase seats on Russia’s Soyuz spacecraft to reach the ISS. Christian Davenport,
SpaceX shuttle successfully hurls into orbit, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2019. By 2015, the cost of a seat on a
Soyuz flight to the ISS was $81.9 million. Christian Davenport, SpaceX’s rockets come under safety
experts’ glare, WASH. POST, May 6, 2018, at A1, A13 (hereinafter Safety Experts’ Glare).
31
32

5

The inquiry attempted here is timely for current debates about competition
law and policy. Some commentators have criticized modern antitrust
enforcement for adopting a single-minded focus on the output and pricing
effects of business practices and ignoring other important considerations,
such as the impact of these practices on innovation and the development of
new products and services. 34 A suggestion in this critique is that public
enforcement policy requires a dramatic reorientation that puts innovation and
quality related concerns front and center in policy analysis, especially for
mergers, and applies entirely new analytical tools to determine how conduct
and market structure affect innovation. The ULA episode reminds us that
innovation is not a novel antitrust issue and that innovation effects have been
paramount (or at least coequal with price effects) in major categories of
antitrust matters—especially for aerospace and defense industry
transactions. Since World War II, attaining qualitative superiority has been
an overriding objective of national defense policy. 35 Federal antitrust
enforcement policy has reflected the primacy of innovation as a guarantor of
U.S. supremacy in the design and production of weapon systems.36 In taking
this approach, the antitrust agencies have embraced the view of
commentators who argue that the preservation of independent centers of
34

See William E. Kovacic, The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of US Antitrust History, 87
CHI. L. REV. 459, 460 & n.3 (2020) (collecting commentary critical of a “consumer welfare” framework
that ignores considerations other than output and pricing levels).
35
The importance of maintaining qualitative superiority as the chief concern of modern U.S. weapons
acquisition policy is discussed in William B. Burnett & Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Industry, in
THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 289 (Walter Adams ed., 8th ed., 1990).
36
See, e.g., Joint Statement of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission on
Preserving Competition in the Defense Industry (Apr. 12, 2016) (“In the defense industry, the Agencies
are especially focused on ensuring that defense mergers will not adversely affect short- and long-term
innovation crucial to our national security . . . .”), available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2016/04/ftc-doj-statement-preserving-competition-defense; J. Robert Kramer II, Antitrust
Review in Banking and Defense, 11 GEO. MASON L.REV. 111, 112 (2002) (hereinafter Antitrust Review)
(“A major goal of antitrust in the defense industry is preserving the number of innovators and
innovation paths in a setting where, ex ante, the right innovation path is not obvious.”); J Robert Kramer
II, Chief, Litigation II Section, U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Antitrust Considerations
in International Defense Mergers (Presentation before the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, May 4, 1999). In explaining the Justice Department decision to oppose the proposed
merger of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, Antitrust Division official Robert Kramer
observed: “While the [DOJ]complaint alleged significant price effects, I think it’s fair to say the
principal driver of our challenge was the merger’s effect on innovation. As the Attorney General
indicated when the case was filed, a loss of innovation can literally have life and death implications for
our servicemen and women.” Id. at 12-13. For launch vehicles and other complex aerospace and
defense systems, the benefits from using competition among two or more suppliers to generate cost
savings to the DOD are highly uncertain, or doubtful, when the number of units acquired falls below a
certain level. See National Defense Business Institute, University of Tennessee, Economic Modelling of
the Effects of Lot Buys and Competition on Government Expenditures for EELV for FY2013 to FY 2017,
at 8-10, 14-27 (Jan. 2012) (discussing experience with dual-sourcing major weapon systems and
implications for DOD acquisition of launch services).
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inventive activity should be the foremost antitrust concern in reviewing
defense mergers.37
A second timely aspect of a review of the ULA transaction is the light it sheds
on the many forms of government intervention that constitute a nation’s
competition policy. The prosecution of antitrust cases is but one way by
which governments can help foster competition and stimulate business
rivalry.38 Perhaps most important, the ULA episode illuminates the power
of public procurement policy, including funding of private sector research
and development and the acquisition of goods and services, to influence the
course of competition.39 A key part of the ULA story is how government
agencies—first NASA, and later the DOD—used their funding and
purchasing decisions to facilitate entry into the space launch services market
by SpaceX and other private firms.40 Through policies that can be correctly
characterized as procompetitive, the government purchasers helped catalyze
new entry that transformed a sector seemingly destined to be the province of
two firms or a single survivor. NASA, in particular, experimented with a
new business model to inject more rivalry into the launch services sector.
The ULA experience provides inspiration to ask how government
procurement policy could achieve similar results in other concentrated
sectors of the U.S. economy.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I recounts the background of ULA’s
creation and examines the competition policy reviews carried out by the
DOD and the FTC. Part II sketches the modern framework for antitrust
analysis of aerospace and defense industry mergers and describes significant
analytical and policy trends. Part III reviews how the FTC and the DOD
See, e.g., William E. Kovacic & Dennis Smallwood, Competition Policy, Rivalries, and Defense
Industry Consolidation, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 102-03 (1994) (“Competition’s greatest benefit in
weapons acquisition arguably is its power to spur firms to devise ingenious approaches for
fulfilling DoD’s mission requirements. . . . The main potential hazard of mergers is the danger that
technological competition will diminish, and that specific technologies may become entrenched as
the one or two remaining suppliers freeze out innovative design approaches that threaten their
vested interests or defy conventional wisdom.”).
38
The distinction between “antitrust” and a broader notion of “competition policy” is developed in R.
Shyam Khemani & Mark A. Dutz, The Instruments of Competition Policy and Their Relevance for
Economic Development, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 16
(Claudio R. Frischtak ed., 1995). Antitrust agencies have come to realize that, in executing their own
mandates, it is valuable to complement a law enforcement program with the application of non-litigation
tools such as advocacy before other government agencies, the preparation of reports, and the convening
of public hearings. More Than Law Enforcement: The FTC’s Many Tools – A Conversation with Tim
Muris and Bob Pitofsky, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 773 (2005).
39
The significance of these policy tools as stimulants for competition is examined in William E.
Kovacic, Government Support for Research and Development, in THE SHRINKING INDUSTRIAL BASE:
RESTRUCTURING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND ENSURING AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS FOR THE
1990S (Annual Meeting Program Volume, American Bar Association, Section of Public Contract Law,
Aug. 1990).
40
See infra Part V.A.
37
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evaluated the ULA joint venture proposal and spells out the considerations
that guided the FTC’s decision to allow the transaction to proceed with few
qualifications. Part IV recounts experience in the MTH launch services
sector over the past decade, emphasizing the impact of the ULA transaction
on reliability and the development of potential rivals to ULA. Part V
examines the policy implications of the ULA experience, including
observations about the application of competition policy to mergers in high
technology sectors in which innovation is a preeminent competitive concern.
Part VI concludes.
Before getting started, I note two sets of professional experiences relevant to
the ULA transaction and the A&D sector generally. First, in describing and
interpreting the review by the DOD and the FTC of the ULA proposal, I am
not a neutral observer. I was a member of the FTC from January 2006
through September 2011, and I participated in the agency’s deliberations
about the ULA joint venture from January 2006 until early October 2006. I
voted in favor of the Commission’s decision to approve the deal with
conditions. Although I conclude in this Article that developments to date
indicate the FTC made a sound judgment about the ULA transaction in 2006,
the discussion below underscores the risks and uncertainties that surrounded
the agency’s assessment.41 The Article identifies where I have gone beyond
publicly available source materials and drawn upon my own recollection of
events.
A second set of experiences outside the FTC informs my understanding of
the A&D sector and how the application of antitrust and government
procurement rules affect its performance. I was an associate with the Bryan
Cave law firm from 1983 to 1986 and, after going to academia, served as of
counsel to the firm from 1990 to 1998. With Bryan Cave I worked on various
projects for McDonnell Douglas (“MD”), though none involved the
company’s launch vehicle division, which Boeing acquired in 1998 when it
bought MD. In the early to mid-1990s, I wrote papers for the RAND
Corporation on topics related to competition in the defense industry, and I
participated in a project led by Booz Allen Hamilton in 1999-2000 for the
U.S. Air Force on the future of competition in the launch vehicles sector.
Individuals who have worked in the private sector, or done consulting for
organizations whose clients include public institutions (such as NASA and
the U.S. Air Force) responsible, as buyers and regulators, for engaging with
private suppliers sometimes are appointed to senior leadership positions in
government agencies. When this happens, there are recurring, legitimate
questions about the world view that such appointees bring to public service
41

See infra notes XX and accompanying text.
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and how that world view affects their decisions as government officials.
Before coming to the FTC, first as General Counsel from 2001 to 2004 and
then as a member of the board from January 2006 through September 2011,
I had written a number of academic papers that set out my learning from
earlier professional experiences and my normative views about competition
in the aerospace and defense sector.42 Collectively, these papers provide a
comprehensive view of the policy preferences that guided my thinking about
the ULA transaction in 2006.
I.

FORMATION OF THE UNITED LAUNCH ALLIANCE JOINT VENTURE

In May 2005, following extensive consultations with the DOD and other
government customers, Boeing and Lockheed Martin (“LM”) announced
plans to form the United Launch Alliance joint venture.43 The companies
planned to combine engineering and administrative functions near LM’s
offices in Denver and to consolidate design and production work at Boeing’s
Decatur, Alabama facility.44 The firms also would unify their launch site
operations staffs at Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg Air Force Base.45 ULA
would sustain production of the firms’ families of launch vehicles (Delta for
Boeing, and Atlas for Lockheed Martin), but the production work would be
performed by a team that integrated personnel from the two companies.46

42

William E. Kovacic, Toward the Development of a Unified Trans-Atlantic Defense Procurement
Market, 2006 Ford. Corp. L. Inst. 179 (Barry Hawk ed., 2007); William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy
Analysis of Joint Ventures and Teaming Arrangements by Government Agencies and the Courts, in
SUBCONTRACTING, TEAMING AND PARTNERING IN THE AGE OF CONSOLIDATION AND COOPERATION
(American Bar Association, Section of Public Contract Law, Nov. 1997); William E. Kovacic,
Government Support for Research and Development, in THE SHRINKING INDUSTRIAL BASE:
RESTRUCTURING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND ENSURING AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS FOR THE
1990S (American Bar Association, Section of Public Contract Law, Aug. 1990); William E. Kovacic,
The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Public Regulation of the Weapons Acquisition Process, in ARMS, POLITICS,
AND THE ECONOMY: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 104 (Robert Higgs ed., 1990);
William E. Kovacic, Blue Ribbon Defense Commissions: The Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems, in
ARMS, POLITICS, AND THE ECONOMY: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 61 (Robert
Higgs, ed. 1990); William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas
Merger and International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805 (2001); William E. Kovacic,
Competition in the Postconsolidation Defense Industry, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 421 (1999); William E.
Kovacic & Dennis Smallwood, Competition Policy, Rivalries, and Defense Industry Consolidation, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 91 1994); William E. Kovacic, Regulatory Controls as Barriers to Entry in Government
Procurement, 25 POL’Y SCIENCES 29 (1992); William E. Kovacic, Commitment in Regulation: Defense
Contracting and Extensions to Price Caps, 3 J. REG. ECON. 219 (1991); William E. Kovacic, Merger
Policy in a Declining Defense Industry, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 543 (1991); William E. Kovacic, Antitrust
Analysis of Joint Ventures and Teaming Arrangements Involving Government Contractors, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 1059 (1990); William B. Burnett & William E. Kovacic, Reform of U.S. Weapons
Acquisition Policy: Competition, Teaming Arrangements, and Dual-Sourcing, 6 YALE J. REG. 249
(1989); William E. Kovacic, Illegal Agreements with Competitors, 57 Antitrust L.J. 517 (1988)
43
ULA Formation Press Release, supra note 2.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
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The parties advanced two principal rationales for the transaction. First, the
consolidation would yield hundreds of millions of dollars in cost savings
through the elimination of personnel redundancies and superior operational
integration.47 These savings, in turn, would reduce the price that government
purchasers paid for launch services.
The second, and more important, justification involved scale economies.48
Falling demand for launch services, for national security purposes and for
commercial applications, had reduced production rates (referred to in the
industry as “tempo”49 ) for both firms. 50 Over time, a smaller number of
launches was being subdivided between the two organizations. As a result,
neither Boeing nor Lockheed Martin could realize the learning benefits that
come from more extensive experience. Diminished experience reduced the
proficiency of each team and increased the risk of launch failures, which
could deny the DOD needed access to critical communications and
reconnaissance satellites.51
The companies stated that the combination of all experience in a single,
integrated team would raise capability and improve performance above
levels that prevailed when Boeing and Lockheed Martin maintained
independent design and production teams. When the ULA venture was
announced, Boeing’s Chief Executive Officer, James Bell, explained: “By
joining together, we are convinced that we can provide the customer with
assured access to space at the lowest possible cost while ensuring enhanced
reliability by eliminating duplicative infrastructure and bringing experts from
both companies to focus on mission assurance.”52 Daniel Collins, a Boeing
executive appointed to be the new ULA chief operating officer, added: “The
continued performance of Boeing and Lockheed Martin employees as a new
team going forward – from the engineering center to the factory floor to the
launch pad – will offer even greater reliability and mission assurance to the
customer.”53
The press release announcing formation of the venture said: “Based upon initial estimates, annual
savings to the government resulting from the combination are expected to be approximately $100-150
million.” Id.
48 As stated in one classic account, scale economies “result when the increased size of a single
operating unit producing or distributing a single product reduces the unit cost of production or
distribution. Alfred Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 17
(Belknap Press, 1990).
49 See Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5, at 3 (defining “launch tempo” as “the number of
booster cores built in the assembly line and launched per year”).
50
See FTC Analysis to Aid Public Comment, supra note 4, at 60150 (reviewing concerns about falling
levels of launches and the distribution of a declining amount of work across two workforces).
51
Id.
52
ULA Formation Press Release, supra note 2, at 2.
53
Id. at 2-3.
47
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The companies did not directly address the possibility that the unification of
MTH launch services capability in a single enterprise might not serve the
government’s best interests over time. The companies hinted that concerns
about pricing for future launches would be alleviated through the continued
application of the government’s systems for monitoring costs and that, in any
event, the gains from consolidation were compelling. At the time ULA was
announced, Lockheed Martin’s Chief Executive Officer, Robert Stevens,
said “It has become increasingly clear that an alliance of launch capabilities
is essential to meet the space communications, surveillance and
reconnaissance needs of the 21st century, and to assure access to space.”54
Stevens added that the ULA joint venture “will permit our national customers
to achieve their mission objectives while reflecting current budget pressures
and providing the government with full cost visibility.”55
In 2005, students of the companies had reason to doubt the sanguine
assessment of the Boeing and LM executives about how the new venture
would achieve a synthesis of capability that surpassed what the firms could
achieve acting independently. For several years before the ULA venture was
announced, Boeing and LM had engaged in bitter litigation involving
competition to provide launch services to the DOD. Lockheed Martin had
sued Boeing for alleged misconduct in competing for awards in the Air Force
Extended Expendable Launch Vehicle Program (EELV) and accused Boeing
of violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the
Florida Civil Remedies for Criminal Activities Act, the Sherman Act, and
the Florida Antitrust Act. 56 In the same case Boeing filed a counterclaim
alleging that LM had engaged in unfair competition and tortious interference
with contractual relations and had violated the Lanham Act and the Florida
Unfair Deceptive and Trade Practices Act.57 The agreement to create ULA
stipulated that, upon the closing of the transaction, the companies would seek
an order to suspend their litigation in federal district court concerning the Air
Force EELV program.58
II.

THE PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF
DEFENSE INDUSTRY MERGERS: MODERN TRENDS

54

Id. at 1.
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21, 2005).
58
ULA Formation Press Release, supra note 2, at 3. Regarding the pending litigation between the two
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The review of mergers involving defense contractors involves contributions
from the U.S. antitrust agencies (the DOJ and the FTC) and the government
purchasing agencies (e.g., DOD). The DOJ and the FTC assess the
compatibility of transactions with the federal antitrust laws. The defense
purchasing authorities provide their views to the antitrust agencies and
determine whether the transaction satisfies government procurement
requirements governing matters such as the assignability of government
contracts. As described below, the government buyers do not control the
antitrust analysis, but their views carry considerable weight in decisions by
the DOJ or the FTC to attempt to block a merger, to accept a settlement, or
to clear a transaction without conditions.
A.

Antitrust Review Process

The principal mechanism for federal antitrust scrutiny of mergers and joint
ventures is Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 59 which forbids consolidations
whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition.” 60 Proposed
transactions above certain size thresholds must be notified in advance to the
federal antitrust agencies.61 The federal antitrust agencies have a protocol
that determines which agency will review the matter. Allocations made under
the interagency “clearance” procedure are based on the relative levels of
expertise of each agency regarding the products and firms in question.
Once the parties have notified the transaction, the federal antitrust agency
ordinarily has 30 days to decide whether to request additional information.
Pending the parties’ compliance with this “second request,” the transaction
may not be completed.62 Once the parties have complied with the second
request, the antitrust agency has 30 days to decide whether to seek an
injunction in federal court to block the transaction or to accept a settlement
to resolve potential competitive problems.63 If the agency takes no action
within the 30-day period, the parties can consummate the transaction. The
deadlines set in this framework can be (and sometimes are) extended by
agreement between the agency and the parties.64 If the DOJ or the FTC desire
to block a proposed merger, the agency must seek an injunction in federal
59
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district court. Neither agency has the power, acting on its own, to prohibit a
transaction.65
In cases involving defense industry mergers, the question of whether and
how officials from the government purchasing agency will testify, and
whether they will endorse or oppose the merger, are crucial factors in
determining how the antitrust agencies will proceed.66 Since the mid-1980s
until 2005 when Boeing and Lockheed notified their agreement to the U.S.
antitrust agencies, the DOJ and the FTC had reviewed numerous proposed
mergers involving firms in the aerospace and defense industry.67 Between
them, the two federal antitrust agencies had examined a number of
transactions involving either Boeing or Lockheed Martin. The FTC cleared
Boeing’s purchase of McDonnell Douglas and permitted Boeing to acquire
the satellite division of Hughes, subject to conditions.68 The DOJ accepted
settlements that permitted Lockheed to acquire Marietta and the combat
aircraft operations of General Dynamics.69 In the late 1990s, the DOJ sued to
block Lockheed Martin from purchasing Northrop Grumman, causing the
parties to abandon the merger.70
By the time the ULA joint venture was announced in 2005, several trends
had emerged in antitrust reviews by the DOJ, the FTC, and the federal courts.
The federal agencies generally had challenged transactions that threatened to
reduce from 2 to 1 the number of suppliers for weapon systems or inputs to
those systems. The agencies had opposed such “mergers to monopoly” in
matters involving tank ammunition (Olin/Alliant),71 image intensifier tubes
used in making night vision devices (Imo/Optic Electronics),72 submarine
design and construction (General Dynamics/Newport News Shipbuilding),73
65

Id. at 422-23.
Kramer, Antitrust Review, supra note 25, at 111 (“The DOD is, of course, for the antitrust agencies
the critical witness in any enforcement action; a status that stems from its role as sole buyer of many
products.”); William E. Kovacic & Dennis Smallwood, Competition Policy, Rivalries, and Defense
Industry Consolidation, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 91 (1994); William E. Kovacic, Competition policy in the
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Postconsolidation Defense Industry).
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Defense Industry, supra note 55, at 422-23.
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International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805 (2001); Kovacic, Postconsolidation Defense
Industry, supra note 55, at 422-23.
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72 FTC v. Imo, Inc., 1992-2 Tr. Cas. (CCH) ¶69,843 (D.D.C. 1988).
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and defense electronics systems (Lockheed Martin/Northrop Grumman).74
Few cases had been litigated to a resolution on the merits, and in each of
these decisions the district court had enjoined the merger (e.g., Olin/Alliant).
The aversion of the antitrust agencies towards these 2 to 1 defense industry
mergers was not absolute. In a few cases, the antitrust authorities had
approved mergers to monopoly. Raytheon was permitted to purchase the
tactical missiles division of Hughes without conditions, and the FTC’s
unconditional clearance of Boeing’s acquisition of McDonnell Douglas
combined the only two U.S. suppliers of aerial refueling tankers. 75 More
recently, in 2013, the FTC approved a merger to monopoly between
Gencorp’s Aerojet division and Pratt & Whitney’s Rocketdyne division.76
These rare approvals have rested heavily on recommendations from the DOD
regarding the likely volume of future purchases of the system in question and
the costs associated with sustaining two independent design and production
teams.
B.

The Role of the Government Purchaser

Olin’s unsuccessful attempt in 1992 to purchase the tank ammunition
operations of Alliant spurred important changes in the role of the government
purchasers and their cooperation with the DOJ and the FTC in merger
reviews. Faced with a 2 to 1 merger, the FTC sued in federal court
to block the tank ammunition deal. 77 The merging parties defended the
merger on the ground that the transaction was the only suitable way to ensure
that key capabilities were preserved amid declining production volumes that
made a down-select to one firm inevitable.78
Some constituencies within the Department of the Army agreed with the
parties and favored the transaction. At the trial, the merging parties called a
senior Army official to appear as a witness.79 Against a backdrop of active
discussions between the DOD and the FTC, the DOD front office instructed
the Army official to give testimony that was faintly and ambiguously
supportive to Olin and Alliant. Under examination by the trial judge, the
74

United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp. Case No. 4332, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,098 (D.D.C.
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Army official reported that he was permitted to say only that the Army “has
no objection to the proposed merger” and “takes no official position
concerning the antitrust implications of the transaction.”80 When pressed by
the judge to offer a view about whether the DOD affirmatively supported the
merger, the Army official demurred. Hearing no positive backing for the deal
from the DOD, the judge sustained the FTC’s request for an injunction.81
Had the DOD, in giving its professional opinion about the transaction’s
impact on national security, testified squarely in favor of the deal, one
suspects that the judge would not have enjoined the merger.
The near collision between the DOD and the FTC in the courtroom in
Olin/Alliant inspired the creation of a Defense Science Board (DSB)
advisory panel which recommended, among other steps, closer coordination
between the antitrust agencies and the DOD involving proposed defense
mergers. 82 The DOD created a liaison office to work with the antitrust
authorities to gather information and to present a coherent statement of the
DOD’s opinion about specific transactions.83 In organizational terms, DOD
is not a single-minded institution. The Department embodies a large
collection of subsidiary bodies. Within such a complex institution, it is
unsurprising that there might be varied (and contested) views about the
merits of a proposed merger. The liaison process reforms were designed to
assist the Department in formulating a single institutional recommendation
and to communicate its opinion to the antitrust agencies. The liaison process
also provided a useful means for the DOJ and the FTC to explain their own
decision-making methodology and to identify factors that mattered the most.
The operation of the enhanced liaison mechanism improved communications
between the antitrust agencies and the government purchasers, especially by
engaging the two groups in data collection and substantive discussions early
in the life cycle of the transaction. The results were evident in the DOJ’s
successful efforts to block Lockheed Martin’s attempted acquisition of
Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics’s purchase of Newport News
Shipbuilding’s submarine design and production operations. It was apparent
that, in both cases, there was some disagreement among groups within the
DOD about the merits of these deals. Yet, in both cases, the DOD announced
that it supported the DOJ’s assessment of the transactions and would testify
against the mergers in court.84
FTC v. Alliant Techsystems Inc., 808 F. Supp at 23.
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As suggested above, the views of the DOD ordinarily are decisive in antitrust
reviews by the DOJ and the FTC.85 Neither agency desires to appear in a
courtroom where the DOD will testify on behalf of the merging parties and
support the transaction. The agencies understand that the DOD’s views about
what best serves the nation’s security interests likely will be persuasive to
the federal judge. At least in general terms, the antitrust agencies can have
confidence that the DOD is sympathetic to their concerns about the potential
adverse effects of consolidation among its suppliers. The DOD ordinarily
will be aware of the benefits of competition in depressing prices and
providing a larger range of design and product choices.86 At times in the past
decade, DOD officials have expressed concerns that consolidation has so
reduced the number of suppliers for specific weapon systems that the
surviving incumbents possess substantial market power and wield it in ways
that undermine the national interest.87
The DOD is aware of the hazards it may face when it is required to rely upon
a single supplier. Sometimes, however, the Department may decide that other
policy considerations are more important. These considerations can include
ensuring the preservation of certain industrial assets (which may be retained
with greater certainty through a merger than through a winner-take-all
competition) and reducing the fixed costs associated with maintaining two
or more centers of design and production capability.88
The Aerojet/Rocketdyne merger, mentioned above, underscores the crucial
part that the DOD’s views play in the antitrust review process. The FTC
concluded that the proposed merger would give Aerojet a monopoly over
certain control systems and would increase the price of and reduce
innovation to develop these systems. Consultation with the DOD led the
Commission to stand down: the agency said it would not challenge the
85
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transaction in light of the DOD’s support for the transaction. In its closing
letter, the FTC explained that “[i]t has been and continues to be the
Commission’s practice to defer to the Department of Defense’s assessment
of [the non-economic] benefits and to accord that assessment significant
weight in exercising the Commission’s prosecutorial discretion.”89
The DOD’s role as a monopsonist buyer for many defense-related systems
means that, in some cases (such as Aerojet/Rocketdyne) the antitrust
authorities must use advocacy and persuasion before the government
purchasing officials rather than the threat of litigation as the main tools for
advancing their competition policy preferences. The DOJ and the FTC must
convince the buyer to weigh competition concerns heavily and to account for
them in the decision about whether to give the DOD’s support to a proposed
deal.
Since the mid- to late-1980s, the federal antitrust agencies have accumulated
extensive experience with joint ventures and mergers involving defense
companies. These reviews created substantial agency expertise in the defense
sector and deep awareness of the institutional setting in which government
purchasing agencies acquire goods and services from private suppliers.
Moreover, the antitrust reviews gave paramount importance to innovation as
a foremost concern in merger reviews and developed methodologies to assess
the likely impact of transactions on the ability and incentive of firms to
achieve qualitative improvements over time.
In a number of A&D transactions, the antitrust agencies have devoted
significant attention to vertical issues as well as to horizontal overlaps. In
Northrop Grumman/Orbital ATK (2008), Northrop Grumman acquired
Orbital ATK, a defense technologies services company and the principal
U.S. supplier of solid rocket motors. 90 Among other goals, Northrop
Grumman made the acquisition to bolster its own position as a provider of
space vehicles. One focus of the FTC’s inquiry was the possibility that the
merged entity might deny or impede the access of Northrop Grumman’s
rivals to Orbital’s solid rocket boosters. To allay the Commission’s concerns,
Northrop Grumman agreed to create a firewall between the newly acquired
solid rocket motor unit and the rest of its business, and to sell rocket motors
to its competitors on a nondiscriminatory basis. The consent agreement
Michael R. Moiseyev, Assistant Director, Bureau of Competition – Mergers I, Federal Trade
Commission, Letter of June 6, 2013 to Susan P. Raps, Deputy General Counsel (Acquisition &
Logistics), Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, at
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allows the DOD to appoint a compliance officer to oversee fulfillment of the
order’s terms.
III.

THE GOVERNMENT’S REVIEW OF THE ULA JOINT VENTURE

When the ULA joint venture was notified to the federal agencies, the FTC
received clearance to conduct the antitrust review based on its larger
experience in studying the launch vehicle sector. Over the course of its
investigation in 2005, the FTC formed the view that the transaction was a
merger to monopoly for mid-to heavy-lift national security launches.91 The
combination of these assets in a single supplier created a strong presumption
that the merger would have serious anticompetitive effects by raising the
prices that government purchasers would pay over time for launches and by
depressing incentives for Boeing and Lockheed Martin to innovate in
advancing the state of the art for launch vehicles.92 Had that been the end of
the analysis, the staff would have emphatically recommended that the
Commission block the transaction, and the FTC’s board would have agreed.
The DOD had another view. By early 2006, the Department had informed
the FTC that it supported the venture to improve reliability. The DOD
acknowledged the FTC’s concerns about the competitive dangers posed by
the joint venture,93 but concluded that the superior reliability promised by the
transaction warranted accepting these risks. 94 As noted earlier, declining
numbers of launches had reduced the amount of work available to the Boeing
91
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and Lockheed Martin teams. 95 This posed a serious possibility that the
proficiency of each team would suffer, and the rate of launch failures would
increase. 96 To the DOD, the joint venture would concentrate design,
production, and launch experience in a single integrated team and thereby
sustain high levels of proficiency. 97 The same result would apply to the
launch site preparation operations of the two companies; Greater proficiency
would generate higher launch reliability. 98 For DOD, this was the vital
consideration, and it warranted acceptance of a plan that would reduce the
number of industry participants to one. NASA also consulted with the FTC
on the transaction and informed the Commission “the cognizant mission
directorates” with the space agency “neither support nor oppose the joint
venture.” 99
A.

Resolution of the Pivotal Competition issues: Efficiency and Entry

The FTC regarded the scale economy, quality, and reliability arguments to
be genuine and significant. 100 There was considerable evidence from the
production of launch vehicles and other defense systems that subdividing a
relatively small and declining amount of work between two teams denied
both teams the experience base needed to be successful. 102 The agency
Id. at 3 (“The current and future commercial launch market, including the inability of U.S. firms
to compete against foreign firms coupled with the low number of national security launches,
makes it extremely difficult for two competing U.S. providers to maintain separate, competing
experienced workforces.”)
96 “Background Information on National Security Space for ULA”, Attachment to Krieg Letter to
Majoras, supra note 5 at 3 (“Historical data (1973-2003) for both Delta II and Atlas II launches
demonstrate that the statistical likelihood for launch failure is reduced as launch rate increases.
At current launch rates for the Delta IV and Atlas V systems, the launch rate for each team is in the
zone where the failure rate is statistically unacceptable.”).
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realized that raising the reliability rate for launches from, say, 95 percent to
98 percent could yield substantial national security benefits. And the agency
was aware that in past transactions (e.g., Raytheon/Hughes), when faced with
a strong efficiency justification and a recommendation to clear from the
DOD, the FTC had permitted a 2 to 1 merger. Yet there was also the
awareness, based on hundreds of past antitrust reviews, that a single supplier
does not feel the same urgency to perform well over time as even a firm that
has one credible competitor.
Boeing and Lockheed Martin also had argued that the joint venture would
generate substantial cost savings (approximately $150 million per year after
an initial three-year transition period) by eliminating the need to maintain
multiple production facilities. Neither the FTC nor the DOD regarded the
cost saving arguments to be persuasive.103
During deliberations over the transaction within the DOD and the FTC,
SpaceX and its chairman (Elon Musk) made appearances before both
agencies. 104 In his conversations at the FTC, Musk did not ask the
Commission to block the ULA transaction but instead to insist upon the
adoption of conditions that would enable SpaceX to obtain government
contracts that would allow the entrant to build capability to provide launch
services to government. Musk emphasized that SpaceX was developing a
business model that, if successful, would greatly reduce the cost of sending
payloads into space. 105 SpaceX had made substantial investments in
Horgan, Curt Rogers & Rachel Schmidt, MAINTAINING FUTURE MILITARY AIRCRAFT DESIGN
CAPABILITY 46-51 (RAND R-4199-AF, 1992); Kovacic, Postconsolidation Defense Industry, supra
note 55, at 429.
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developing its Falcon series rocket design, but it had yet to carry out a
successful launch.106
In most antitrust reviews, the FTC would not have regarded the possibility
of entry and expansion by SpaceX as a basis for approving the merger. There
were many reasons to discount the company’s prospects for success. 107
SpaceX had yet to demonstrate that its concept would work in practice; as
noted above it had yet to carry out a successful test of its Falcon rocket.108
Even if the company’s early, lighter version of the Falcon succeeded, it
would be a long and laborious process to gain confidence in the eyes of
government purchasers, especially the national security customers for launch
services, and to qualify to carry sensitive national security payloads into
space. For decades government buyers of complex aerospace and defense
systems, in making contract awards, had placed great emphasis on the
demonstrated capacity of a supplier to carry out difficult design and
production tasks.109 One could reasonably ask how an untested entrant could
overcome the predisposition of government buyers to deal only with familiar
enterprises with proven track records. Ease of entry can overcome
competition concerns about a highly concentrative merger, but the SpaceX
entry story seemed a long distance—perhaps a prohibitive distance—from
accomplishment.
B.

The FTC’s Decision Not to Seek to Block the Venture
As a private company, SpaceX would also avoid the waste and cost overruns associated
with government contractors.

Vance, supra note 12, at 114. This was the message that Musk conveyed to the author during his
visit to the FTC in connection with the ULA transaction.
106 SpaceX would not accomplish a successful launch of its Falcon rocket into earth orbit until
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brought 2 NASA astronauts back to Earth in its Crew Dragon spaceship, kicking off “the next era in
human spaceflight,” BUS. INSIDER, Aug. 2, 2020, at https://www.businessinsider.com/spacex-safelysplashes-down-nasa-astronauts-crew-dragon-demo2-mission-2020-8,
108
In the early to mid-2000s, Musk’s goal of achieving regular, low-cost access to earth orbit seemed
unattainable. See Vance, supra note 12, at 116 (“As good as a cheap launch vehicle sounded, the odds
of a private citizen building one that worked were beyond remote.”).
109 See Kovacic & Smallwood, supra note 26, at 106-07 (discussing importance to government
purchasers of the contractor’s track record in previous programs).
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Given the DOD’s support for the merger, the FTC’s options were severely
constrained. Going to court without the DOD’s support seemed to be a
formula for a litigation failure.110 To succeed, the agency would have to seek
to impeach the DOD by attacking the technical details of its analysis,
questioning the soundness of its professional judgment, or even to cast doubt
about its motives—suggesting perhaps that the Department had been
captured by its powerful, legendary suppliers (Boeing and Lockheed Martin)
and blinded to the possibilities that an unconventional entrant could bring to
the field. It appeared unlikely that, given the choice between the views of
the DOD and the FTC on national security interests, a federal judge would
embrace the FTC’s position.111
Even if the FTC had prevailed in litigation and obtained a judicial order
blocking ULA’s formation, the DOD had the ability to foster the creation of
a ULA equivalent if it desired to consolidate all development and production
work for heavy launch vehicles in a single firm. The DOD could have
initiated a “down select” in which it announced its intention to cease
allocating contract funds to two firms (Boeing and LM) and to issue future
contract awards to a single firm which would become the exclusive supplier
to the department. In that scenario, Boeing and LM would have prepared
proposals that advanced the case for each to be the survivor of the down
select. Once the DOD had completed the competition and chosen its sole
supplier, the winner likely would have absorbed the losing company’s
valuable launch vehicle resources, skilled personnel and facilities.
In deciding how to proceed in its own investigation and negotiations with the
DOD, the FTC was aware that the government’s national security purchasing
agencies ultimately could resort to this procurement strategy to achieve their
goals if they concluded that having a single supplier best served their
interests. The DOD was partly constrained in pursuing the down select
strategy by a national space policy presidential directive that dictated
maintenance of two separate families of launch vehicles (i.e., Lockheed
Martin’s Atlas and Boeing’s Delta).112 Nonetheless, the DOD might have
110

This was my perception as a member of the Commission, and a majority of my colleagues shared the
view.
111 In an action by the FTC for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the merger, the federal court
could take one of essentially two paths to allow the joint venture to proceed. The court could
conclude that the efficiency benefits of the parties outweigh the anticompetitive harms posited by
the FTC, or the court could find, in determining whether the public interest dictated the issuance
of an injunction, that the national security concerns advanced by the DOD favored clearance of the
joint venture.
112 See RAND, Space Launch Report, supra note 91, at xiv-xv (describing National Space Policy
Transportation directive issued in December 2004); Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5, at 2
(“To avoid losing the ability to launch critical national security payloads, the National Space
Transportation Policy requires the Department to sustain two evolved expendable launch vehicles
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obtained a relaxation of this requirement and allowed a down select to
proceed.
The FTC decided to close its investigation and clear the transaction after the
government buyers provided soft indications that they would consider new
entrants, but no hard concessions embedded in an enforceable order. Did the
Commission’s participation in the ULA episode make any positive
contribution to competition for launch vehicles and related services or to the
quality of decision-making regarding mergers and joint ventures in the
aerospace and defense industry? The FTC took some steps to mitigate the
transaction’s possible adverse vertical foreclosure effects. With the DOD, the
Commission agreed upon settlement terms that would limit the ability of
ULA to discriminate against future launch services entrants and to
disadvantage rival suppliers of satellites.113 The ULA parties agreed to these
terms, and the DOD established a compliance mechanism to see that the
requirements would be fulfilled.
The Commission also attempted to make the terms of the resolution of the
matter more transparent.114 It sought and received from the DOD a letter that
detailed the Department’s reasons for endorsing the transaction.115 In doing
so, the FTC usefully pressed DOD to put its cards on the table, to go beyond
vague assertions of a national security interest and to describe more fully
how the formation of the ULA venture would serve national security goals.
The DOD letter spelled out the economies of scale rationale for the
consolidation and spoke, at a high level of generality, of being receptive to
efforts by new entrants to qualify as suppliers to the national security
customers. 116 The DOD also expressed its confidence that an enhanced
launch vehicle acquisition strategy and the application of government
procurement mechanisms to monitor supplier costs and other aspects of
contractor operations would ensure that the Department obtained launch
services from ULA on reasonable terms. 117 The letter did not address the
(EELV) until the Department can certify assured access in space through reliance in a single
vehicle.”).
113 FTC Analysis to Aid Public Comment, supra note 4, at 60151; Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note
5, at 1-2.
114
Federal Trade Commission, Statement of William E. Kovacic, with whom Chairman Deborah Platt
Majoras and Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch Join, In the Matter of Lockheed Martin Corp., The Boeing
Co,., and United Launch Alliance, L.L.C., FTC File No. 051 0165, Docket No. C-4188.
115
Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5.
116 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
117 Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5, at 4 {“We believe that adequate oversight coupled with a
prudent acquisition strategy can deliver the benefits of the joint venture while limiting the
competitive risk associated with it.”). The DOD’s mixed record in applying its cost oversight tools
did not inspire similar confidence within the Commission. The strengths and weaknesses of the
government’s tools for negotiating contract terms and monitoring performance for major weapon
systems are examined in William E. Kovacic, Commitment in Regulation: Defense Contracting and
Extensions to Price Caps, 3 J. REG. ECON. 219 (1991).
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possibility that, with a seemingly uncontestable position as the sole supplier
of national security launch services, ULA might feel less urgency over time
to perform at the highest level, notwithstanding the availability to the DOD
of nominally formidable monitoring tools.
The correspondence between the DOD and the FTC was made public when
the parties announced the agreement, along with a detailed closing statement
by the FTC itself. By its insistence on disclosure of the DOD’s rationale, the
Commission arguably added a valuable element of accountability to DOD
(and FTC) decision-making and improved public understanding of the
arguments that shaped the assessment of the transaction.
Finally, the FTC engaged in extensive discussions with the DOD and with
NASA about measures that could facilitate entry into the launch services
business in the future. The FTC staff sought to test whether the aspirations
of SpaceX to qualify as a supplier to government agencies had any genuine
prospects of success. In conversations with the FTC’s staff and, eventually,
with the agency’s leadership, the government agencies expressed their
openness to supporting new entry. Though uncertain about the durability and
reliability of these expressions of interest, the FTC perceived that the
government purchasers saw the value of developing a credible alternative to
ULA. The alternative need not have been fully developed or complete in the
sense that the entrant could compete effectively to serve all of the national
security community’s future needs. It was sufficient that the alternative be
scalable such that the government purchasers could enhance its position if
ULA lagged in fulfilling the reliability goals that motivated its creation. In
short, the FTC was convinced that the government purchasers understood the
potential hazards of being beholden to a single supplier with no credible
threat to switch.
The give and take between the FTC and the DOD can be seen as a form of
competition advocacy, with the FTC attempting to persuade another
government department of how competition could improve the results – in
quality and price – that public agencies can achieve through the procurement
process. As described below, one might infer that this advocacy had some
positive effect within NASA, which became instrumental in opening the door
for SpaceX to become a significant government supplier.
Thus, with written commitments in a consent order to resolve vertical
foreclosure issues, and with spoken commitments to use best efforts to
support new entry, the FTC approved the ULA venture’s formation.
IV.

EXPERIENCE FROM 2006 TO THE PRESENT
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From a competition policy perspective, the consolidation of the nation’s
MTH launch capacity in the ULA venture was difficult for the FTC to
swallow and a source of strong institutional discomfort. The Commission
and its staff recognized that the transaction presented significant competitive
risks – notably, the creation of a durable, uncontestable monopolist supplier
of launch vehicles and services essential to national security.118 The agency
had acute concerns that long term performance in the relevant market would
suffer unless the government buyers had a credible threat to shift purchases
away from ULA and engage at least one alternative supplier. The wisdom of
the FTC’s decision to approve the transaction depended on its assumptions
that the economies of scale efficiencies would prove to be real and robust,
and that the possibilities for entry and expansion by SpaceX (or other firms)
would be more than a mirage.
As described below, both assumptions that underpinned the FTC’s decision
have been borne out. The most sanguine view of the Commission’s decision
is that the agency exercised shrewd, farsighted judgment about what it would
take to preserve competitive options for government buyers, and it took a
well-calculated risk that SpaceX would prove to be the necessary competitive
stimulant in the future.
A more doubtful assessment is that the agency embraced the SpaceX entry
scenario because it had no other choice; it capitulated because the creation
of a launch vehicle monopoly for government missions was inevitable, either
because the parties would prevail in court with the DOD’s support, or
because the DOD, even if the federal district court upheld the FTC’s view
and enjoined the venture, would find a way to conduct a two-to-one down
select.

A.

ULA’s Reliability

With stunning effectiveness, ULA has achieved the reliability objectives that
the parties offered as a major motivation for the venture’s formation.120 As
Tory Bruno, ULA’s Chief Executive Officer, has observed, reliability is the
certifying characteristic of the joint venture: “We’re always on time. We
always work. That’s the core of our company.” 121 ULA is aware that
The creation of the joint venture clashed with policy proposals that the author had made
before joining the Commission. See Kovacic & Smallwood, supra note 26, at 102 (“We would apply
a presumption that . . . the government can derive significant, additional benefits from preserving
at least two competitive alternative sources for each type of weapon system, and there may be a
strong case for three or even more in certain critical areas.”).
120 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (observing that rom the time of its formation through
July 30, 2020, ULA had accomplished 140 consecutive successful launches).
121
Craig Mellow, The Other Rocket Man, AIR & SPACE, June/July 2018, at 64, 69.
118
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delivering superior reliability is vital at a time when SpaceX now enjoys a
substantial cost advantage and is offering significant launches to commercial
and government customers at prices well below ULA’s.122
Would Boeing and Lockheed Martin have achieved a similar success rate
had ULA not been approved and the two firms had operated independently?
That is unknowable. There is evidence, however, that the integration of
capabilities advanced by Boeing and LM as a foundation for more efficient
operations took place haltingly and incompletely. In a profile of Tory Bruno
published in 2018, Craig Mellow described the difficulties that ULA faced
in melding the predecessor organizations into a cohesive team:
The original idea behind ULA was to reap efficiency by combining two formerly competing
rocket families, Lockheed’s Atlas and Boeing’s Delta. It didn’t quite work out that way. Under
the joint ULA roof, the two clans remained separate, if not hostile, duplicating management
functions and costs from top to bottom. “The staffs from the two product lines didn’t really
mix all that much,” Bruno says. “They had their own cultures.” He banged his subordinates’
heads together, leaving “one-third fewer boxes on the organization chart.”123

In retrospect, the FTC and the DOD should have been more skeptical than
they were about efficiency claims that depended on the harmonious
integration of the Boeing and LM rocket teams. The amalgamation of fierce
rivals into a single enterprise, in almost any institutional setting, ordinarily
faces strong internal resistance. A full knitting together of the predecessor
bodies after a merger, and the creation of a new collective spirit, may take
years to accomplish, if it happens at all.124 The fact that the ULA partners
recently had engaged in bitter litigation involving competition for launch
contracts, 125 and that Boeing and LM were antagonists in other weapon
system markets, such as combat aircraft,126 provided further reason to doubt
that the new venture would benefit significantly from the combination of its
founders’ rocket production and launch operations organizations. Nothing
about the relationship between Boeing and LM before they announced the
ULA venture suggested that the firms would work well together, and the FTC
Id. at 69 (reporting that as of mid-2018, “the basic sticker price” for a ULA Atlas V launch was $109
million compared to $61 million for a SpaceX Falcon 9 launch).
123
Mellow, supra note 110, at 67.
124
The examination of hundreds of mergers over the years should have given the FTC a keener
awareness of the serious problems that postmerger integration poses, even for deals that ultimately are
by some measure successful.
125
Several years before the formation of ULA, Lockheed Martin sued Boeing in federal district court in
Florida for alleged misconduct in connection with competitions to obtain launch contracts with the U.S.
government. The LM complaint accused Boeing of violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, the Florida Civil Remedies for Criminal Activities Act, the Sherman Act, and the
Florida Antitrust Act. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. The Boeing Co., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (M.D. Fl.
2004).
126
Boeing currently produces the F-15 and F-18 fighters, and Lockheed Martin produces the F-22 and
F-35 fighters. The companies regularly face vie with each other for sales of these and other aircraft
designs (such as trainers) to the U.S. government and to foreign countries.
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should have pressed the parties, and the DOD, harder to explain how the
companies expected to overcome the enmity between them.
There remains the interesting question of how ULA has been able to achieve
a perfect record of successful launches since the formation of the venture. To
what extent did the efficiencies that Boeing and Lockheed Martin anticipated
in 2006 actually come to pass? Were there efficiency benefits that the parties
did not anticipate ex ante but nonetheless emerged unexpectedly as the
venture proceeded? These issues would seem to be worthy additional study
by the DOD and the FTC to improve their understanding of what industrial
measures improve performance in this dimension.
B.

The Successful Development of SpaceX

Has SpaceX evolved into an increasingly credible supply alternative for
commercial and government purchasers, alike? Unmistakably, it has done so,
often in a disruptive fashion that has upset prevailing assumptions about
rocket design, testing, and pricing. In the most general terms, SpaceX
embraced the role of a maverick untethered by norms that discourage
experimentation and innovation.127 As Craig Mellow has written:
Among space enthusiasts, [Elon] Musk and the company he founded, SpaceX, are the
disrupters, the swashbuckling innovators whose cheap, reusable rockets will pave the way
for an explosion of orbital commerce and creativity. Old Space, according to this
construction, stays hopelessly mired in the past.128

With its disruptive entry into the space industry, SpaceX has become the
antidote to any complacency on the part of ULA. 129 By some measures,
SpaceX has become the preeminent U.S. supplier of launch services.130 As
journalist Irene Klotz observes, a new wave of entry spearheaded by SpaceX
has given government purchasers a range of options that seemed improbable
in 2006:
It is a problem the U.S. Air Force once wished it had: multiple companies competing to launch
its mission-critical satellites into a range of earth orbits. Now, legacy contractor United
Launch Alliance . . . is in a fight for its existence as it squares off against SpaceX – which in
127

In describing the relationship between SpaceX and NASA, Christian Davenport has noted the
“tension between the safety-obsessed space agency and the maverick company run by Musk, a tech
entrepreneur who is well known for his flair for the dramatic and for pushing boundaries of rocket
science.” Davenport, Safety Experts’ Glare, supra note 22, at A13. Davenport adds: “In this culture
clash, SpaceX is the daring, Silicon Valley-style outfit led by a man who literally sells flamethrowers on
the Internet and wholeheartedly embraces risk.” Id.
128
Mellow, supra note 110, at 64.
129
Id. at 66-69 (describing how entry and expansion by SpaceX led ULA to alter its business strategy)
130
For example, in 2018, SpaceX completed 20 missions, over 60% of the U.S. launches for the year.
Irene Klotz, On the Ascent, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 24, 2018-Jan. 13, 2019, at 80.
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2016 broke ULA’s monopoly on the military’s space launch business – and new offerings
from Northrop Grumman and Jeff Bezos’ startup Blue Origin.131

Among other effects, the presence of SpaceX and other launch vehicle
producers has pressed ULA to reduce the price it offers government buyers
and to undertake major improvements in its line of launch vehicles.132
SpaceX has performed well in four noteworthy areas of endeavor:
Technical Proficiency. SpaceX has emerged as an innovative force in launch
vehicle design, production, and operations. 133 Among the most notable
achievements is the development of a reusable vehicle that, following a
launch, can descend to the earth’s surface and land on a platform on land or
on the sea.134 The company’s customers have welcomed the application of
this technology (and its favorable cost-saving consequences), and SpaceX
routinely uses previously launched boosters for its missions.135 SpaceX also
has developed a reusable spacecraft (the Dragon) that can perform multiple
deliveries into space over time.136
The company has progressed from the deployment of smaller versions of its
Falcon launch vehicle to more powerful systems. The most notable of these
131

Irene Klotz, Rocket Rivalry, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 3-16, 2019, at 32 (hereinafter Rocket
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Landing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9-10, 2016, at B4 (reporting successful trial of landing technique for
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(recounting SpaceX success in deploying reusable vehicle technology); First Take, AV. WK. & SPACE
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is the Falcon-Heavy, which in 2018 carried another Musk-created object (a
cherry-red Tesla Roadster) into space.137 The development of a more capable
family of launch vehicles is a major step toward realizing Elon Musk’s vision
of becoming the preeminent launch services provider to government and
commercial customers.
Commercial Markets. SpaceX has become an important supplier of launch
services for commercial enterprises in the communications sector. Key
milestones have included the successful launch in March 2017 of a
communications satellite for SES and the launch of communications
satellites for Iridium and for its own Starlink internet system138 SpaceX has
helped catalyze reductions in the price of commercial launch services and
facilitated entry by a host of companies that are seeking to create new
communications networks with low earth orbit satellites.139
Government Non-Military Launch Services. Since the approval of the ULA
venture in 2006, SpaceX has become an increasingly significant supplier of
launch services for NASA.140 In 2008, NASA gave SpaceX a $1.6 billion
contract to make cargo deliveries to the International Space Station (ISS).141
The SpaceX Cargo Dragon made its first delivery of cargo to the ISS in
October 2012. 142 In March 2019, SpaceX sent a prototype of the Crew
Dragon spacecraft to the ISS, setting the stage for the successful flight of the
Crew Dragon and its astronauts to the ISS in 2020. 143 The successful
completion of the Crew Dragon Demo-2 mission has underscored the
leadership that SpaceX now holds in its contest with Boeing to become the
preeminent supplier of rockets and capsules for human space travel.144 The
company is now positioned to play a key role in developing other launch
137
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vehicle capabilities that will support other NASA space exploration projects,
including human spaceflight to the Moon and Mars.145
National Security Launch Services. Not only has SpaceX delivered nondefense payloads into space,146 it gradually has become a more significant
participant in the national security segment of launch vehicle services for
U.S. government agencies.147 In head-to-head competitions with ULA after
2014, the U.S Air Force awarded SpaceX several national security
launches.148 The most striking indication of the ascending stature of SpaceX
with the national security agencies came on August 7, 2020, when the Air
Force announced that it had selected SpaceX and ULA to receive five-year
contracts totaling $653 million to launch satellites for the National Security
Space Launch (NSSL) program.149 As journalist Jeff Foust remarked, the
NSSL contract award underscored how far SpaceX has come from its early
days as an aspiring supplier to the national security agencies; “Six years ago,
SpaceX was the upstart launch company seeking to break United Launch
Alliance’s monopoly on national security space launches. Now, it’s part of
the establishment.” 150 The rivalry between ULA and SpaceX for national
145
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security missions, once exclusively the domain of ULA, promises to remain
intense.151
The path to the successful outcomes described here has not been entirely
smooth from either a technical or institutional perspective. SpaceX has
experienced spectacular, unnerving failures with boosters and capsules.152 In
each instance, the company has treated operational failures as means to
discover the path to ultimate success; it has strived to identify the causes of
each failure and appears to have taken effective corrective measures.153 Some
of the company’s critics – including its rival, ULA – have suggested that
SpaceX has taken too casual an attitude toward risk and underinvested in a
testing regime that might reduce operational failures.154 Such criticism often
comes with a recognition that SpaceX has injected extraordinary vitality into
the space industry and that pre-existing norms accepted by the government
purchasers and its suppliers too heavily favored caution at the expense of
innovation and technological progress, at least in the case of unmanned space
flight.155
The institutional hurdles to becoming a valued supplier to government
agencies also have been formidable. The relationships of SpaceX with its
U.S. government customers have not been friction free. From time to time,
SpaceX has accused NASA and the DOD of taking steps to diminish the
company’s access to government funding and to launch services contracts
and to reinforce the preeminence ULA enjoyed at the time of its formation
151
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See Mellow, supra note 110, at 66 (Quoting Troy Bruno, head of ULA’s Atlas and Delta rocket unit:
“Elon Musk is someone you have to absolutely admire for the excitement he has brought back to space.
Space was getting kind of boring for the general public.”); see also Davenport, Safety Experts’ Glare,
supra note 22, at A13 (quoting Greg Autry, Assistant Professor of Clinical Entrepreneurship, Marshall
School of Business, University of Southern California and Member of the Presidential Transition
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in 2006.156 On two occasions, SpaceX has sued the Air Force on the ground
that it unreasonably excluded SpaceX from contract awards. In 2014, SpaceX
filed a bid protest to challenge sole source awards the Air Force had made to
ULA for heavy launch contracts.157 The protest appears to have led the Air
Force to open more of its business to competitive bidding. 158 In 2019,
SpaceX filed a bid protest to challenge the decision by the Air Force in
October 2018 not to award ULA a contract for the Phase I Launch Services
Agreement.159 The Air Force and SpaceX settled this dispute on terms that
appear to have enabled the company to participate in the Air Force program.
There also have been suggestions that, for the Crew Commercial program to
send astronauts to the ISS, NASA unjustifiably has subjected SpaceX to
more exacting safety audits than Boeing.160
V.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS GOING FORWARD

A.

Government Procurement as a Stimulus for Competition

The success of SpaceX has depended crucially upon the fulfillment by the
government buyers of their soft commitment in 2006 to consider SpaceX as
an alternative to ULA. NASA was the pivotal actor in this process. The
agency encouraged the development of a new business model that relied
principally on the private sector to devise, deploy, and operate space
vehicles. 161 Journalist Richard Waters well describes the significance of
contributions of NASA and the entrants it helped inspire:
The emergence of a start-up space industry, led by Elon Musk’s SpaceX and Jeff Bezos’s Blue
Origin, has led to a new symbiosis in space. The tech groups see Nasa as an important early
customer as they pursue their grand long-term visions – while the space agency has found
ways of riding on the back of their development work rather than creating the technology for
its programs from scratch.162
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From 2006 onward, NASA gave increasingly stronger signals that it would
entertain offers from SpaceX to provide non-military launch services and it
gave the company contracts for smaller launches that foreshadowed
additional work in the future. In the first term of his presidency, Barack
Obama made a bold and controversial decision to rely chiefly on a not yet
well developed commercial space sector to provide an essential foundation
for the nation’s space exploration program. 163 From the initiation of the
Mercury program through the end of the Space Shuttle programs in 2011, the
United States purchased hardware and services from external suppliers;
NASA owned the space system assets and operated the facilities from which
they were launched into space. The new approach anticipated that private
firms would build launch vehicles and spacecraft and send them into space
(often using launch pads leased from or acquired from the government).
An important step toward creating an environment that enabled entry by
SpaceX and other private firms into the launch services sector was NASA’s
creation of the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (“COTS”)
program.164 COTS anticipated that private firms would the ability to provide
space transportation capabilities and provide, beginning in 2011, launches to
supply the International Space Station (“ISS”).165 This was the first in a series
of measures that spurred the development of SpaceX and other new entrants,
including Blue Origin, which is owned by Jeff Bezos, the founder of
Amazon.
Encouraged by a largely successful series of launches, NASA in 2014 took
the still bolder step of selecting SpaceX, along with Boeing, to participate in
its Commercial Crew Program, which NASA would rely on private firms to
build and operate the next generation of human space transportation
systems.166 Although Boeing received a larger share of NASA funds for the
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program, 167 SpaceX was first to return U.S. astronauts to space with an
American-made vehicle launched from the United States.168 SpaceX is one
of three firms (along with teams headed by Blue Origin and Dynetics) that
NASA has chosen to compete to provide the space agency with a system to
land humans on the Moon.169
In taking these steps and other steps, NASA departed in significant respects
from the stereotype of government buyers as being captured by commercial
interests, exceedingly risk-averse in program design, and incapable of
creative thinking that uses the power of public purchasing to stimulate
competition among suppliers. Over the past fifteen years, NASA has pursued
a conscious strategy to encourage entry that expands the number of quality
of centers of inventive and productive activity that can serve its needs.
NASA also has shown patience in tolerating occasional failures that entrants
must experience to gain capability and achieve dramatic design
breakthroughs and improvements in performance.
The NASA experience with SpaceX warrants close study by other
government purchasing authorities and competition policy agencies as a
model of how well-calculated risk taking in the expenditure of public funds
can facilitate procompetitive entry by new suppliers, even into unusually
difficult technological domains. NASA’s successful pro-entry strategy is the
most recent illustration of a more general phenomenon documented in a
number of modern studies: that public procurement, in outlays for research
and development, hardware, and services, has considerable power to
stimulate valuable innovation and rivalry in the private sector. 170 These
possibilities are especially important today in sectors that might seem, for the
moment, to be impervious to entry and expansion by new firms.
B.

The Role of the Antitrust Agencies

The ULA competition review in 2006 and the evolution of the launch vehicle
sector suggests several features of good practice for antitrust agencies (and
public procurement authorities) in evaluating the competitive effects of
mergers. The experience underscores the value of systematic collection of
167
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data and analysis about past experience. The consideration of arguments in
2005-2006 about reliability improvements arising from the formation of
ULA benefitted enormously from work done by the DOD, by RAND, and
other researchers about scale economies and learning in the design and
production of complex systems.171 The data provided confidence that ULA’s
creation could yield important improvements in performance.
The ULA case also indicates the value for policy making of interagency
cooperation that enables distinct institutions with shared or complementary
policy duties to diagnose problems and devise solutions. The DOD
collaboration with the FTC facilitated a well-informed decision making
process and helped both institutions apply their skills usefully to the problem.
The analysis also profited greatly from the accumulation of relevant expertise
in both agencies over time: in the DOD, greater knowledge about the
substance and process of antitrust law, and in the FTC, greater knowledge
about the aerospace and defense industries, and about procurement decision
making in the DOD.
C. Meaningful Disclosure
The ULA experience suggests the value of a transparent revelation of the
reasons for decisions taken. The ULA decision made the DOD and the FTC
nervous, and there were temptations to offer less informative, general
explanations of the reasons for the outcome. A more complete description of
the reasons for a difficult decision exposes the agency to more secondguessing, but it injects needed discipline into the decision making process
itself. By putting their cards face up on the table, and setting out the key
assumptions behind the ULA decision, the DOD and the FTC enabled
students of competition law and defense acquisition to better understand
what happened, to see what worked, to identify what failed, and to do it better
the next time.172
That said, the transparency surrounding the decision by the DOD and the
FTC could have been greater. For example, the FTC could have said more
about its doubts that new entry would take place to constrain ULA and its
concerns about the efficacy of DOD monitoring and oversight tools to press
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
With the FTC’s encouragement, the DOD explained why it supported the DOJ’s lawsuit to block
General Dynamics’ purchase of Newport News Shipbuilding, where the fear was that a merger to
monopoly would reduce innovation in the design and production of submarines. See Department of
Justice, Press Release, Justice Department Files Suit to Block General Dynamics’ Purchase of Newport
News Shipbuilding (Oct 23, 2001); Krieg Letter to Majoras, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing why “the
national security interests present in this transaction distinguish the Department’s analysis of this
transaction from our analysis of the 2001 acquisition of Newport News Shipbuilding by General
Dynamics, which would have resulted in a nuclear shipbuilding monopoly”).
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ULA to control costs. Careful documentation of initial expectations provides
an important foundation for ex post evaluations that can illuminate how
antitrust agencies (and procurement authorities) can improve decision
making in future merger analysis.
D.

Innovation in Merger Analysis

The large experience that the DOJ and the FTC have gained from reviewing
mergers in the aerospace and defense industry can be a valuable source of
insights into how antitrust policy can account for innovation issues in other
sectors. The evaluation of the ULA transaction and numerous other A&D
mergers suggests several focal points for study of innovation effects in any
transaction. 173 An essential starting point is to identify the industrial
competencies needed to design and produce the product or service in
question. The second step is to determine which firms currently possess
those competencies and to assess the strength of each competency within the
firm. For technologically dynamic sectors, for example, the firm’s
proficiency often depends on the volume of its expenditures for research and
development and the types of R&D projects it is undertaking to stay at the
frontier of the technical state-of-the art. A third step is to assess the firm’s
capacity to take innovative ideas, translate them into inventive designs, and
produce the product or service in question. Past success in running a
successful production program—solving problems associated with the
organization of the work flow, the assembly of component parts, and the
application of quality control techniques—can be a valuable indicator of the
firm’s ability to design products that will work and build them effectively.
A fourth step is to evaluate the firm’s proficiency in accomplishing postproduction maintenance and repair functions and in devising and installing
upgrades that account for experience gathered in the course of using the
product and responding to changing conditions.
The DOJ and FTC experience with aerospace and defense transactions has
involved many applications of this basic framework. The know-how
accumulated from A&D merger reviews is readily transferable to the analysis
of mergers in other technologically dynamic sectors, extending from the
earliest stages of the R&D pipeline to the routine deployment of the products
or services.
E.

Case Retrospectives
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The analysis used in this Article suggests a basic, useful approach that
competition agencies can use to evaluate and improve their decision making
in merger reviews. The essence of the approach is to examine the
assumptions and predictions that guided the agency’s analysis, to compare
those assumptions and predictions to actual experience, and, where actual
experience deviates from the predicted outcome, or contradicts the initial
assumptions, to ask what the agency might have missed in its original
assessment and what it should look for in conducting future reviews.
Merger analysis sometimes involves making difficult judgments about likely
future events based on information that is inevitably incomplete or lends
itself to conflicting interpretations. Retrospectives that compare assumptions
and predictions to actual results can improve future inquiries by identifying
overlooked factors or providing a better basis to judge whether conceptual
possibilities (e.g., the realization of efficiency benefits) are likely to come to
pass. The value of the retrospective depends heavily on the completeness
and honesty with which the agency documents its analysis, along with key
assumptions and predictions, and tests its analysis against actual outcomes.
The identification of actual results may benefit from collecting information
ex post from the merged entity and other industry participants. One can even
imagine convening discussions, after enough time has passed, in which the
government decisionmakers (here, the FTC and the DOD) and the private
parties and their advisors review the decision making process and the results
of the transaction.

VI.

CONCLUSION

By combining the nation’s MTH launch capability for U.S. government
missions into a single enterprise, the creation of the ULA joint venture
contradicted the basic presumptions that the federal antitrust agencies
ordinarily brought to the analysis of transactions in the aerospace and defense
sector. The agency responsible for the antitrust review of the transaction, the
Federal Trade Commission, had strongly disfavored mergers to monopoly.
Departures from this policy had been rare and had required exceptional
justifications. The Department of Defense endorsed the ULA venture and
probably would have testified in favor of its approval had the FTC chosen to
go to court to enjoin the deal. The DOD’s support created powerful pressure
for the FTC to acquiesce, and the agency allowed the transaction to proceed
subject to conditions that addressed vertical features of the venture.
A plausible efficiency rationale supported the DOD’s support for the ULA
venture and influenced the FTC’s assessment. A decline in the number of
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launches for U.S. government customers threatened to deny the ULA
partners, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, the level of activity needed to
maintain the proficiency of their design, production, and launch teams at the
highest levels. Thus, the continued subdivision of launches between the two
companies could undermine their reliability and result in an unacceptable
number of launch failures for government missions.
A large body of experience from previous aerospace programs indicated that
concerns about learning and scale economies were not an illusion. Yet the
DOD and the FTC still had to confront the possibility that, at some point after
the joint venture’s formation, the ULA partners might experience a loss of
urgency to control costs and, more important, achieve qualitative
improvements in their launch systems. How would government purchasers
motivate the joint venture to improve performance if they had no credible
threat to switch to an alternative supplier? What was the fallback for the
government if ULA, perceiving itself to be the only means for the
government to launch payloads into space, shirked?
Before closing its inquiry, the FTC sought assurances from the DOD and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration that the government
purchasers would seek to qualify other firms to provide launch services. The
DOD and NASA acknowledged the dangers of relying on a single supplier
(ULA), but they provided only spoken assurances—no written
commitments—to exercise best efforts to encourage entry by other firms into
this technologically complex and capital intensive industry. No company
appeared to be an especially attractive candidate to succeed as a new entrant,
even with encouragement from the DOD or NASA. SpaceX made
presentations to the FTC and predicted that it could use innovative rocket
designs to surpass ULA if it received launch services contracts from the
government purchasers. Yet, at the time of the FTC’s antitrust review,
SpaceX had yet to carry out a successful launch of its rocket, the Falcon.
Thus, aided by the DOD’s formidable institutional support, a plausible
efficiency justification, and a fragile possibility for new entry into the launch
services sector, the ULA venture received antitrust clearance. To the relief
of the government actors (certainly for the FTC and the author, and probably
for the DOD), experience over the past fifteen years has been astonishingly
positive. ULA has achieved an unblemished record of successful launches
since its creation, though it is unclear that Boeing and Lockheed Martin
achieved the smooth integration of teams that the parties held out as the
foundation for improved reliability. And SpaceX has thrived. Even the
hardiest optimist could not have imagined in 2006 that SpaceX and other new
entrants into rocketry would have established themselves, by 2020, as
credible alternatives to ULA as suppliers of launch services to the U.S.
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government. On the basis of its success to date in launching human and nonhuman payloads, SpaceX arguably has drawn even with, if not surpassed,
ULA in the race to become the country’s (and the world’s) preeminent launch
services provider.
To recite this favorable series of events is not to say that continued success
is inevitable. The history of space exploration has made clear that its
participants, government agencies and commercial enterprises alike, can take
nothing for granted. There are many tests ahead to determine whether
SpaceX or firms such as Blue Origin and Orbital ATK (now owned by
Northrop Grumman) can demonstrate the sustainability of a new, more
commercially oriented business model for launch services. But it is
appropriate to take a moment to recognize that the ULA partners and SpaceX
thus far have accomplished what they set out to do in 2006, and that the
hesitant spoken promises of best efforts that the DOD and NASA gave the
FTC ripened into a series of procompetitive measures that facilitated entry.
Beyond the launch services sector, the ULA experience provides some
guidance for future policymaking by the antitrust agencies and government
purchasers. The developments with ULA, SpaceX, and other commercial
launch services firms were not the product of mere luck. The DOD and the
FTC applied their knowledge of the aerospace industry to make
sophisticated, principled judgments about the possible learning curve and
scale economies rationales that Boeing and Lockheed Martin offered as bases
for creating ULA. This highlights the benefits that agencies can realize from
applying expertise gained from having processes and organizational methods
that bring past experience to bear upon the analysis of new problems.
Also noteworthy for future merger analysis is the positive role that the
government purchasers, first NASA and then the DOD, played in providing
opportunities for SpaceX to develop as a supplier of launch services for
government missions. The government buyers understood the difficulties
they would face if they did not encourage new entry as an option to ULA and
a stimulus for innovation in the design of space launch systems. The
establishment of a commercial space services sector has broader
implications, as it demonstrates how creative procompetitive public
procurement policies can diversify highly concentrated markets and catalyze
unanticipated improvements in products and services.
NASA, in particular, embraced an entrepreneurial approach that required the
agency to modify longstanding methods for obtaining launch services. This
experience should motivate procurement policymakers, in Congress and in
government agencies, to reassess existing views about government
procurement and the benefits and costs of having public purchasing bodies
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experiment with novel techniques. The ULA experience suggests there is an
untapped potential for public procurement to boost competition that
improves the nation’s wellbeing, but the realization of the potential will
require the use of methods that are novel and in some senses more risky that
traditional procurement approaches.
If the nation is willing to accept, as it should, more innovation and risk taking
in the procurement process, it will have to acknowledge that innovation and
risk-taking sometimes result in program failures. We can respond to failures
in one of two basic ways. We can accept such failures as a necessary price to
pay for the good results that innovation and risk taking ultimately can yield,
or we can take the failures as proof that cautious adherence to existing
routines is the only appropriate way to spend public funds. To do the latter
wrings creativity and imagination out of our public procurement system, at a
great cost.174 Perhaps the ULA/SpaceX experience can embed in our minds
how the willingness to take well-calculated risks (which differs considerably
from simple throw-of-the-dice gambling) and to learn from the failures that
sometimes occur can open the door to product and service breakthroughs that
transform industries for society’s great benefit.
The evaluation of the ULA transaction in 2005–2006 also underscores a
consideration that should be paramount in the thinking of the antitrust
agencies and the government purchasers when examining future proposed
mergers that will have a highly concentrative effect, such as reducing the
number of suppliers to two firms or a single survivor. What will the
government buyers do if the remaining firm or firms perform inadequately—
for example, by exercising weak discipline over costs, failing to provide
desired levels or quality, or showing little imagination or initiative in
developing new technologies or designs? It seems that a vital element of the
answer to this question is always to think in terms of fostering one or more
alternatives. These options need not be immediately available to be
effective, as the emergence of SpaceX from 2006 onward suggests. For an
incumbent supplier, the buyer’s conscious attention to encouraging new
entry is an antidote to complacency. For the buyer, pro-entry policies may
create unimagined possibilities for addressing the government’s needs. For
these reasons, the ULA and SpaceX story deserves careful, continued study
by competition policy specialists and procurement policymakers for decades
to come.
Some of the country’s most impressive, innovation-rich experiences in the aerospace and defense
fields have emerged from entrepreneurial risk-taking by government agencies, their procurement teams,
and private suppliers. Before achieving success, the government and its contractors often had to
overcome major setbacks. See, e.g., EYE IN THE SKY: THE STORY OF THE CORONA SPY SATELLITES
(Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon & Brian Latell eds., 1998) (essays recounting the development and
deployment of the Corona reconnaissance satellite system).
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